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1.1	The	disturbance	factors	In	western	societies	the	main	economic	theories	are	based	on	markets	and	how	markets	can	 adjust	 themselves.	When	markets	do	not	deliver	 the	desired	 results,	 especially	 in	respect	 to	 economic	 growth	 levels,	 fiscal	 and	monetary	policies	 have	been	devised	 to	help	to	correct	the	imbalances.		To	help	overcome	the	effects	of	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis,	central	banks	in	the	U.S.,	in	Europe	and	in	Japan	have	resorted	to	lowering	interest	rates	to	historical	lows.	Such	lows	have	been	maintained	from	2008	to	well	into	2016	and	few	indications	are	at	hand	that	these	rates	might	return	to	pre	2008	levels	any	time	soon.	The	same	central	banks	have	also	entered	 the	government	bond	markets	by	 initiating	substantial	programs	of	buying	up	such	bonds	and	in	the	case	of	the	U.S.	also	of	mortgage	backed	securities.	In	Europe,	the	ECB	and	the	Bank	of	England	did	buy	some	corporate	bonds	as	well.		The	 side	 effects	 of	 both	 these	measures	 have	 been	 that	 the	 banking	 sectors	 on	 both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	have	been	hammered	in	ways	that	was	unforeseeable	back	in	2008.	Banks’	profit	 levels	are,	to	a	 large	extent,	dependent	on	interest	rate	margins	between	the	 interest	 rates	charged	 to	 their	borrowing	customers	and	 the	 interest	paid	 to	 their	fund	providers.	In	the	environment	of	stricter	central	bank	rules	and	a	much	greater	use	of	Internet	banking	coupled	with	a	very	low	base	rate,	great	pressure	has	been	put	on	the	net	interest	rate	margins.	If	banks	can’t	make	sufficient	profits	out	of	their	core	role	of	 lending	 to	 their	 customers,	 their	 ability	 to	 help	 finance	 future	 borrowings	 is	 also	impaired.	On	top	of	this,	the	activity	of	quantitative	easing	has	caused	long-term	interest	rates	 to	 drop	 to	 very	 low	 and	 sometimes	 even	 negative	 interest	 rates,	 especially	 for	governments’	 borrowings.	 Again	 banks	 are	 severely	 hampered	 in	 their	 profit	making	activities	in	that	under	current	market	conditions	having	a	government	bond	portfolio	on	their	books	can	barely	add	to	their	profit	levels.	The	banking	situation	is	more	fragile	in	Europe	 than	 in	 the	U.S.	 as	U.S.	banks	have	been	strongly	encouraged	 to	 raise	more	equity	 capital	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years.	 In	 the	 U.S.	 the	 level	 of	 doubtful	 debtors	 is	generally	lower	than	in	some	European	countries.	The	IMF	reports	that	global	debt	now	stands	at	$152	trillion,	of	which	two	third	are	carried	by	liabilities	of	the	private	sector.		Not	 only	 banks	 are	 under	 pressure,	 but	 also	 life	 insurance	 companies	 and	 pension	funds.	The	IMF	in	its	global	financial	stability	report	of	October	5,	20161	concludes	that:	“The	solvency	of	many	 life	 insurance	companies	and	pension	 funds	 is	 threatened	by	a	prolonged	period	of	low	interest	rates.”		In	an	article	in	the	Sunday	Times	of	20	October	2016	 another	 side	 effect	was	mentioned:	 “Dividends	 set	 to	 disappear	 into	 a	 pensions	black	hole”.	The	corporate	sector	in	the	U.K.	could	be	forced	to	pay	substantially	more	into	 their	 defined	 benefits	 pension	 funds	 as	 the	 deficit	 has	 hit	 a	 record	 high	 of	 £710	billion	in	August	2016	according	to	PricewaterhouseCoopers2.	This	deficit	was	just	£250																																																											1	https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/	2	http://pwc.blogs.com/press_room/2016/08/pension-deficit-grows-by-100bn-in-a-month-according-to-pwcs-skyval-index-.html	
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																																																																																																																			The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		million	ten	years	ago.	Companies	are	closing	such	DB	schemes	as	 fast	as	they	can,	but	this	 only	 means	 that	 the	 risks	 of	 low	 interest	 rates	 are	 transferred	 to	 individual	households,	who	now	face	an	uphill	struggle	to	provide	for	a	decent	pension	in	old	age.	The	risks	to	society	as	a	whole	do	not	disappear;	they	are	only	transferred	to	individual	households	who	have	no	way	of	defending	themselves.		When	banks,	life	insurance	companies	and	pension	funds	are	all	under	severe	pressure,	one	must	wonder	whether	and	how	such	a	 situation	arose	and	what	could	have	been	done	differently.		
1.2	Economic	growth	levels	in	the	U.S.	before	and	after	the	financial	crisis	
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																																																																												The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		The	main	conclusion	out	of	tables	1	and	2	is	that	changes	in	the	long-term	debt	situation	of	 individual	 households	 can	have	both	positive,	 but	 also	 strongly	 negative	 effects	 on	short-term	 economic	 growth.	 Table	 1	 shows	 a	 positive	 short-term	 growth	 level	 for	2010,	but	the	long-term	household	debt	problems,	especially	mortgage	debt	levels,	had	not	been	solved,	as	table	2	shows.		Another	fascinating	fact	is	that	U.S.	government	debt	barely	 changed	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 nominal	 GDP	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2007,	 but	dramatically	increased	from	2008	onwards.		Households’	mortgage	 debt	 levels	 increased	 very	 rapidly	 from	2001	 to	 2007,	 both	 in	actual	levels	and	more	importantly	as	a	percentage	of	nominal	GDP	levels.	The	national	gearing	 ratio	 on	 mortgage	 debt	 went	 up	 and	 up	 over	 this	 period.	 The	 IMF	 in	 its	International	 Financial	 Statistics	 overview	 for	 the	 period	 1990-2003	 assessed	 U.S.	household	consumption	level	at	67.8%	of	GDP.			The	clash	that	occurred	over	the	period	2001-2007	was	that	when	the	growth	in	long-term	 household	 debt	 far	 outstripped	 GDP	 levels,	 at	 some	 stage	 the	 repayment	obligations	would	force	consumption	levels	to	be	reduced.	The	statistics	on	foreclosure	filings	provide	the	clearest	 indication	for	the	start	of	 the	turn	around	point.	When	the	filings	 level	 starts	 to	 go	 up,	 the	 finance	 providers	 put	 households	 under	 increasing	pressure	 to	 allocate	 more	 of	 their	 income	 to	 debt	 servicing.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 reduced	macro-economic	consumption	level.	If	this	happens	on	a	large	scale	as	happened	in	the	U.S.	 over	 the	 period	 2005	 to	 2014	when	 23.250	million	 households	were	 confronted	with	foreclosure	filings	out	of	the	51.6	million	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	2007,	then	a	recession	and	a	slow	growth	period	sets	in.			In	 the	 U.S.	 case,	 the	 financial	markets	 through	 their	 extensive	 use	 of	mortgage-backed	securities	accelerated	the	process.	These	securities	were	daily	tradable	and	in	2007	the	French	bank	BNP	Paribas	stopped	trading	in	three	funds	as	there	was	no	liquidity	in	the	market	 any	 longer.	U.S.	 long-term	mortgage	debt	 had	been	 converted	 to	daily	 tradable	instruments	for	sale	in	the	U.S.	but	also	in	many	countries	outside	the	U.S.	In	2007/2008	generally	 banks	 around	 the	 world	 did	 no	 longer	 trust	 one	 another	 and	 the	 financial	system	came	under	immense	liquidity	pressures.	Some	banks	like	Lehman	Brothers	went	under.		What	 has	 often	 been	 overlooked	 or	 just	 accepted	 as	 consequence	 of	 a	 free	 market	philosophy	is	that	the	debt	service	obligations	from	a	mortgage	debt	do	not	only	affect	an	individual	household	but	also	equally	influence	the	macro-economic	situation.			In	 1997	 the	 total	U.S.	mortgage	debt	 constituted	43.6%	of	Nominal	GDP.	 In	 the	 same	year	 the	number	of	new	housing	 starts	were	1.5	million.	 If	 in	1997	all	new	mortgage	lending	 would	 have	 been	 allocated	 to	 newly	 built	 homes,	 each	 home	 would	 have	 a	mortgage	attached	to	it	on	average	of	$227,580	while	the	average	U.S.	home	sale	price	was	 $	 176,200.	 The	 volume	 of	mortgage	 lending	 per	 new	 home	was	 already	 slightly	above	 the	 average	 price	 level	 of	 existing	 homes.	 Such	 a	 situation	 forces	 the	 prices	 of	existing	homes	to	go	up.	If	from	1997	average	house	prices	had	followed	the	CPI	index,				
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	The	statistics	for	foreclosure	filings,	completed	foreclosures	and	home	repossessions	all	point	to	the	deeply	negative	economic	effects	as	a	result	of	a	period	of	excess	lending	to	individual	households.	Between	2005	and	2014	over	23.250	million	households	were	confronted	 with	 foreclosure	 filings 4 .	 This	 compares	 to	 the	 about	 51.6	 million	households	who	in	2007	had	a	mortgage	in	the	U.S.	More	than	45%	of	homeowners	with	a	mortgage	were	confronted	with	a	 foreclosure	 filing	over	 this	period.	 It	 is	very	 likely	that	the	groups	most	affected	were	the	younger	workers,	the	under	35	generation,	and	the	working	 class	 households,	 as	 their	 income	 and	 savings	 levels	 were	 generally	 the	lowest.	 What	 this	 amazing	 figure	 also	 shows	 is	 how	 poor	 the	 macro-economic	 risk	management	 structure	 had	 been	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 2007.	 It	 is	 very	 unlikely	 that	 an	individual	 household	 was	 confronted	 twice	 with	 a	 foreclosure	 filing;	 therefore	 each	filing	meant	a	filing	against	a	different	household.		The	 foreclosure	 filings	 led	 to	 18.3	million	 of	 completed	 foreclosures	 over	 the	 period	2005-2014.	The	ultimate	penalty	 for	being	unable	 to	service	an	outstanding	mortgage	debt	 is	 a	 home	 repossession.	 Over	 the	 period	 2006-2014	 6,145,000	 homes	 were	repossessed.	 	This	 represents	almost	12%	of	 the	 total	number	households	who	had	a	mortgage	in	2007.	The	over	6	million	homes	repossessed	also	caused	a	strong	brake	on	new	housing	 starts.	Around	1.5	million	new	homes	were	built	 annually	 from	1998	 to	2006.	Over	 the	years	2007-2016	 the	average	output	of	new	homes	dropped	 to	nearly	900,000,	which	accidentally	totals	up	to	6	million	less	homes	being	built	over	the	period	2007-2016	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 period	 1998-2006.	 Four	 years	 of	 new	 housing	 starts	were	 lost	 in	 the	period	2007	 to	 to-date:	 a	major	 loss	 in	 output	 and	GDP	growth.	 The	latest	available	data	show	that	in	August	2016	the	annual	new	housing	starts	on	a																																																												4	http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/	
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																																																																													Table	 2	 shows	 another	 fascinating	 fact.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 lowest	 interest	 rates	 on	record,	 individual	 households	were	 forced	 or	 took	 the	 initiative	 upon	 them	 to	 lower	their	outstanding	amount	of	mortgages	by	just	over	$1	trillion5.	They	did	so	from	2007,	when	mortgage	debt	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	reached	a	high	of	73.3%,	to	2015	when	this	level	 was	 brought	 back	 down	 to	 52.6%.	 Again	 this	 action	 by	 individual	 households	shows	 that	 the	 adjustment	 period	 back	 to	 a	 sound	 financial	 situation	 for	 such	households	has	taken	nearly	ten	years.	The	effect	was,	of	course,	a	subdued	growth	in	GDP.																																																																																																																																																																																																							Another	 effect	 of	 the	 overfunding	 process	 in	 home	 mortgages	 during	 1997-2006	manifested	 itself	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 average	 U.S.	 home	 sales	 price.	 As	 stated	above,	by	2007	average	house	prices	were	33%	over	the	CPI	indexed	house	prices	with	as	 base	 1997.	 From	 its	 peak	 of	 $313,600	 in	 20076,	 average	 house	 prices	 dropped	 to	$263,400	 by	 2011,	 to	 only	 gradually	 reach	 the	 2007	 level	 by	 2014.	 Again	 such	 price	adjustment	shows	just	how	long	it	took	the	markets	to	get	back	up	again;	an	adjustment	period	 of	 seven	 years.	 Overfunding	 lead	 to	 overpricing	 of	 homes,	 which	 as	 a	consequence	 led	 to	 a	 period	 of	 underfunding,	 lower	 output	 of	 new	 homes	 and	stagnation	in	prices.	The	latter	process	shows	just	how	long	the	house	funding	cycle	has	lasted:	 nearly	 twenty	 years.	 The	 interlude	 of	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 should	 not	detract	the	reader	that	the	risks	to	the	U.S.	economy	did	not	originate	from	the	funding	side	 of	mortgages	 but	 from	 the	 lending	 side.	 Overfunding	 and	 poor	 quality	mortgage	products	were	to	blame	for	the	crisis,	with	overfunding	having	by	far	the	biggest	impact.		
	
1.4.2	The	impact	on	U.S.	government	debt	levels	

















































































































																																																																																																																				The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		December	2008	the	rate	had	further	risen	to	7.3%.	By	December	2009	it	had	accelerated	to	9.9%,	after	it	peaked	in	October	2009	at	10%.	In	2010	a	slow	recovery	started	and	the	unemployment	 rate	 dropped	 during	 the	 year	 to	 9.3%,	 followed	 its	 drop	 to	 8.5%	 by	December	 2011,	 to	 7.9%	 in	 December	 2012,	 to	 6.7%	 in	 December	 2013,	 to	 5.6%	 in	December	2014	and	5.0%	in	December	2015.										What	is	remarkable	in	this	pattern	is	the	speed	of	the	unemployment	increase.	From	5%	in	April	2008	to	10%	in	October	2009	and	the	slow	return	back	down	to	5%	for	the	first	time	in	October	2015.	It	took	18	months	to	move	from	a	5%	unemployment	rate	in	April	2008	to	10%	by	October	2009	but	it	took	72	months	to	get	the	unemployment	rate	back	down	to	5%	by	October	2015.		 Another	coincidence	worth	mentioning	is	the	changes	in	the	labor	force					participation	rate8.	The	latter	is	defined	as	the	percentage	of	individuals	of	16	years	and	over	out	of	the	total	population	to	actively	be	in	a	job	or	be	looking	for	one.	By	May	2008	this	rate	was	66.1%	of	 the	U.S.	population.	By	October	2009	 it	had	already	dropped	to	65.0%	before	sliding	to	its	lowest	level	of	62.4%	in	September	2015.	In	July	2016	the	level	was	slightly	higher	 at	 62.8%.	 Usually	 a	 lower	 participation	 rate	 is	 the	 consequence	 of	 a	disillusionment	 borne	 by	 a	 large	 group	 of	 individuals	 in	 their	 job	 search	 leading	 to	 a	cessation	 of	 job	 seeking	 altogether.	 It	 can	 have	 structural	 reasons,	 like	 retiring	 baby	boomers,	a	decline	in	workingwomen	and	a	higher	attendance	rate	at	colleges.	Whatever	the	 causes	may	 have	 been,	 the	 slow	process	 of	 getting	 back	 to	 the	 5%	unemployment	rate	 plus	 the	 persistent	 decrease	 in	 the	 labor	 force	 participation	 rate	 implies	 that	 the	recovery	in	the	combined	income	levels	of	all	income	earners	took	at	least	6	years.	This	is	before	the	drop	in	household	real	median	income	is	taken	into	account.			 Combined	 incomes	were	not	only	under	pressure	 from	 the	 foreclosure	 filings,	but	also	from	 the	 loss	 of	 jobs	 and	 the	 lowering	 of	 the	 labor	 force	 participation	 rate.	 All	 this	explains	 why	 an	 aggressive	 mortgage-lending	 boom	 is	 particularly	 destructive	 to	working	class	households	and	thereby	to	an	economy	as	a	whole.		
																					Home	ownership 	
 
       The Census Bureau publishes quarterly data on the level of home ownership in the U.S. The 
data over the second quarter of 2016 show that the level of owner-occupier home ownership 
has dropped to 62.9% at the end of this quarter. This level is the lowest level of owner-
occupier home ownership since 1965. Graph 1 shows the developments in home ownership 















	One	 has	 to	 consider	 what	 incurring	 a	 debt	 position	 really	 means.	 For	 individual	households	 it	extends	their	scope	of	acquiring	goods	and	services.	 Incurring	 long-	 term	debt	for	acquiring	a	home	is	for	nearly	all	households	the	most	important	debt	obligation	ever	entered	into.	No	individual	household	can	be	blamed	for	taking	out	a	mortgage	loan	while	simultaneously	forgetting	to	consider	the	wider	implications	on	the	total	level	of																																																											9	http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/home-ownership-rate	
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	Individual	 households	were	 and	 have	 been	 the	main	 losers	 in	 the	 adjustment	 process.	They	 lost	over	8	million	 jobs	between	April	2008	and	October	2009.	 It	 took	 from	April	2008	 to	 October	 2015	 to	 reach	 the	 5%	 unemployment	 rate	 again.	 23.250	 million	households	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	or	45%	of	all	households	with	a	mortgage.	 All	 these	 households	 had	 to	 prioritize	 debt	 servicing	 out	 of	 their	 incomes	over	 consumer	 spending.	 Individual	 households	 lost	 6.145	 million	 homes	 due	 to	repossession	 over	 the	 period	 2006-2014.	 The	 real	 median	 household	 income	 was	$57,423	 in	 2007	 and	 up	 to	 date	 this	 level	 has	 not	 been	 exceeded	 yet.	 In	 other	 words	household	 incomes	 have	 dropped	 in	 real	 terms.	 The	 labor	 force	 participation	 rate	 has	dropped	from	66.1%	in	May	2008	to	62.8%	by	July	2016.		Individual	 households	 lost	 jobs,	 homes,	 incomes	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 the	 chance	 to	participate	 in	 the	 labor	 force.	This	happened	all	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	unchecked	excessive	mortgage-lending	 pattern	 that	 took	 place	 from	2002-2007.	 If	 this	was	 not	 enough,	 the	consequences	of	the	deterioration	in	individual	households’	financial	position	led	to	even	greater	losses	for	the	U.S.	government.			
	
3.2	The	losses	to	the	whole	population	of	the	United	States	
	When	 individual	 households	 lose	 jobs,	 incomes	 and	 homes,	 the	 performance	 of	companies	 and	 the	 financial	 sector	 also	 take	 a	 battering.	 Company	 losses	 are	 made.	According	to	tax	rules	in	the	U.S.	as	in	many	other	countries,	such	company	losses	can	be	offset	 against	 profits	 in	 subsequent	 years.	 Table	 3	 shows	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 losses	 on	Federal	 Government	 revenues.	 The	 size	 of	 this	 loss	 over	 the	 period	 2008-2015	 was	calculated	as	adding	up	to	$3	trillion.	In	other	words	the	financial	crisis	caused	a	loss	to	the	whole	U.S.	population	of	$3	trillion.	In	2015	there	were	124.6	million	households	in	the	U.S.,	therefore	the	loss	was	$24,077	for	each	household.		As	a	result	of	the	financial	crisis	not	only	did	individual	households	lose	jobs,	income	and	over	6	million	homes,	they	each	were	faced	with	an	additional	debt	of	over	$24,000	to	be	paid	off	out	of	future	income.															It	did	not	stop	there.	The	U.S.	government	in	its	desire	to	get	the	economy	back	on	track	subsequently	spent	an	extra	$7	trillion	on	economic	stimulus	measures	over	the	period	2009-2015.	This	fact	adds	another	$56,180	to	the	debt	per	household.	The	financial	crisis	increased	government	debt	per	household	by	over	$80,000!		One	may	have	to	consider	whether	such	tax	loss	absorption	reflects	a	fair	distribution	of	incomes	between	 companies	 and	 individual	 households.	 Fair	 taxation	 rules	would	 give	individual	households	the	same	rights	as	companies	to	offset	losses	against	future																																																																																																																																				
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																																																																																																																																	The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		incomes.	 However,	 this	 would	 leave	 the	 U.S.	 government	 seriously	 out	 of	 money	 and	would	probably	not	be	very	practical.			The	monetary	policies	pursued	(lowest	interest	rates	on	record	and	quantitative	easing)	led	to	 further	 losses	 in	 income	for	companies	with	DB	pension	schemes,	 for	 individuals	within	DC	pension	arrangements,	for	life	insurance	companies	with	guaranteed	payouts	on	annuity	contracts	and	for	all	 institutions	holding	government	bonds	when	long-term	interest	rates	start	to	rise.	The	size	of	such	losses	are	not	so	easily	quantifiable,	but	the	very	fact	that	the	IMF	warns	for	large	scale	insolvencies	for	these	pension	funds	and	life	insurance	 companies	 if	 current	 low	 rates	 are	 maintained,	 is	 sufficient	 to	 take	 these	threats	seriously.		For	the	U.S.	economy	the	economic	focus	need	a	shift	towards	loss	avoidance	and	in	case	losses	were	not	avoided	a	loss	prevention	strategy.		The	 best	 option	 would	 have	 been	 to	 prevent	 the	 financial	 crisis	 occurring	 in	 the	 first	place,	 however	 this	 was	 not	 done.	 The	 second	 best	 option	 would	 have	 been	 to	 help	individual	households	in	meeting	their	financial	obligations,	with	conditions	attached.	In	the	next	section	proposals	of	how	this	could	have	been	done	have	been	set	out.		What	should	be	clear	from	above	losses	is	that	individual	households	have	been	the	clear	losers	 both	 individually	 and	 collectively.	 Macro-economic	 debt	 management	arrangements	for	them	have	failed	to	the	detriment	of	all	households.		
4	Some	conclusions	and	recommendations	
	The	main	conclusion	that	can	be	drawn	from	the	events	explained	in	this	paper	is	that	it	does	 not	make	 economic	 sense	 to	 let	 individual	 households	 drown	 in	mortgage	 debt,	only	 to	 see	 the	 economy	 create	much	 bigger	 losses	 in	 order	 to	 get	 economic	 growth	back	on	track.																																																																																																																														The	focus	on	economic	growth	rather	than	on	debt	management	has	 led	to	the	wrong	policy	applications	 in	order	 to	 try	 to	get	 the	U.S.	 economy	growing	again.	 Initially	 the	unfettered	 growth	 in	 mortgage	 lending,	 especially	 from	 2003-2007,	 which	 was	 left	unchallenged,	 caused	 households	 to	 be	 exposed	 to	 a	 debt	 level	 that	 they	 could	 not	service	 any	 longer.	 	 The	 policy	 responses	 from	 2008	 onwards,	 setting	 the	 lowest	interest	rates	on	record	and	the	use	of	quantitative	easing	did	not	address	the	existing	debt	management	 issues	 for	 individual	 households.	 The	 system	 of	 letting	 a	 privately	owned	 banking	 system	 sort	 out	 such	 debt	 management	 situation	 did	 exacerbate	 the	problem,	 rather	 than	 solving	 it	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 whole	 nation.	 The	 losses	created	 by	 such	 faulty	 economic	 solutions	 did	 cost	 the	 U.S.	 (and	 also	 other	 nations	following	 the	U.S.	 lead)	 far	more	 than	 any	 adjustment	 to	 the	 cash	 flows	 of	 individual	households	would	have	costs.	The	period	after	2008	has	been	one	of	a	slow	economic	growth	 pattern,	 a	 huge	 increase	 in	 U.S	 government	 debt,	 extremely	 poor	 returns	 for	savers,	including	for	the	many	who	try	to	build	up	a	decent	pension	pot	and	finally	real	wage	levels	that	did	drop	since	2008.		
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																																																																																																																									The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning		For	the	U.S.	economy	the	economic	focus	need	a	shift	towards	loss	avoidance	and	in	case	losses	were	not	avoided	a	 loss	prevention	strategy.	This	 focus	 is	a	 focus	on	particularly	individual	households.	They	suffer	the	prime	losses	in	case	of	excessive	mortgage	lending	growth	levels.		Their	losses	cause	companies	and	after	that	the	government	to	start	losing	incomes.		
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	 The	 mortgage	 crisis	 originated	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 therefore	 it	 is	 probably	 appropriate	 to	formulate	for	this	country	of	how	an	NMB	could	work:																																																																																																										







• Beneficiaries:	Significant	beneficiaries	of	the	risk	sharing	approach	would	be	the	lending	 banks	 and	 mortgage	 bondholders.	 The	 NMB	 should	 be	 placed	 in	 a	position	to	charge	the	fund	providers	for	the	reduced	risks	over	their	mortgage	related	portfolios.																																																																																			
4.3	Economic	benefits	of	having	an	NMB	
		There	will	be	a	number	of	core	benefits	from	having	an	NMB	in	operation.	A	first	one	is	related	 to	 the	 spending	 power	 of	 individual	 households.	 The	 cash	 injection	will	 help	mortgagors	to	fulfill	their	mortgage	obligations,	and	equally	it	enables	them	to	continue	to	 spend	 on	 other	 goods	 and	 services.	 Had	 the	 NMB	 been	 in	 place	 in	 2007,	 such	increased	 levels	of	 economic	activity	would	have	 increased	government	 tax	 revenues.	As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 NMB’s	 operation	 would	 have	 markedly	 slowed	 down	 the	 U.S.	government	 debt	 increase.	 As	 it	was:	 the	 level	 of	 Federal	 government	 debt	 increased	from	$9	trillion	in	2007	to	$19	trillion		(May	2016).		A	 second	 benefit	 is	 related	 to	 house	 prices.	 When	 the	 majority	 of	 foreclosure	proceedings	no	longer	lead	to	home	repossessions,	house	prices	will	drop	less	forcefully	and	be	more	stable.	Such	stability	will	encourage	potential	homeowners	to	come	to	the	housing	 market.	 This	 may	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 more	 stable	 level	 of	 new	 housing	 starts.	Introducing	the	NMB	system	makes	individual	households	less	reliant	on	extremely	low	interest	 rates.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 NMB	 is	 not	 to	 attract	more	 households	 to	 the	 housing	market.	Commercial	banks	do	 that.	The	NMB’s	aim	 is	 to	help	existing	homeowners	 to	fulfill	 their	 mortgage	 obligations.	 For	 these	 homeowners,	 it	 will	 turn	 a	 long-term	borrowing	position	 into	a	 temporary	 favorable	cash	 flow	position,	 independent	of	 the	current	prevailing	 interest	rate.	When	consumer	demand	 levels	 fluctuate	 less,	 there	 is	less	need	for	an	interest	rate	stimulus.																																																																																																					With	the	existence	of	an	NMB,	the	Fed’s	interest	rate	setting	policy	can	move	more	freely.		Quantitative	 easing	 injections	 are	 an	 indirect	 method	 of	 encouraging	 borrowings.	Setting	up	an	NMB	helps	households	in	need	to	fulfill	their	existing	mortgage	obligations	in	a	direct	manner,	rather	than	involve	them	in	more	private	sector	borrowings.	 It	re-aligns	 outstanding	 debt	 with	 future	 earnings	 levels.	 An	 NMB	 creates	 a	 direct	 link	between	 maintaining	 consumption	 levels	 and	 existing	 household	 debt	 levels.	 The	economy	will	become	less	dependent	on	QE	injections.		In	 a	previous	paper:	 “Why	borrowers	 rather	 than	banks	 should	have	been	 rescued”11,	the	 author	 did	 calculate	 that	 the	 total	 NMB	 lending	 level	 during	 the	 operating	 period	2006-2013	would	have	been	about	$1.2	trillion.	This	amount	consists	partly	of	the	zero	interest	 rate	 subsidy	 during	 the	 period	 classified	 as	 the	 recovery	 period;	 for	 the	remainder	 it	 covers	 principal	 amount	 payments	 as	 advanced	 by	 the	 NMB	 to	 the	borrower.	The	combined	amount	is	still	$500	billion	less	than	the	Fed	–as	a	result	of	its	quantitative	easing	operations-has	currently	in	mortgage-backed	securities	on	its	books.			 																																																								11https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68990/	
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	 The	 fact	 that	 no	 preventive	 measures	 were	 taken	 in	 2003-2007	 to	 stem	 the	 annual	volume	 of	 the	 home	 mortgage	 production	 levels,	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 such	 measures	cannot	be	put	 in	place	 today.	The	 first	 issue	 is	 that	 the	overall	management	of	 such	a	system	should	be	entrusted	to	one	U.S.	wide	regulator,	rather	than	have	different	central	and	 state	 authorities	 each	 deciding	 for	 themselves	 what	 is	 the	 optimal	 mortgage	production	level	for	their	area.			
5.1	An	early	warning	system		 An	 ‘early	warning’	 system	 could	 be	 installed	which	 sounds	 an	 alarm	 once	 it	 becomes	clear	that	the	mortgage	allocation	for	new	homes	by	far	exceeds	the	real	market	house	prices	and	nominal	GDP	growth.	Such	a	system	could	use	 ‘traffic	 lights’	 to	warn	banks	that	caution	is	required.		Green	 would	 indicate	 that	 the	 mortgage	 markets	 are	 not	 growing	 too	 fast	 and	 may	continue	 to	 grow	until	 further	notice.	Amber	 for	when	 the	 speed	of	mortgage	 lending	growth	 is	 becoming	 excessive	 and	 signaling	 those	 lenders	 should	 slow	 down	 their	lending	 volumes	with	 red	 reserved	 for	when	mortgage	 volumes	 are	 growing	 too	 fast.	The	 Fed	 could	 indicate	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 the	mortgage	market	may	 safely	 grow.	 Any	institution	exceeding	such	speed	of	growth	might	be	penalized	as	 it	risks	undermining	the	volume	targets	needed	to	avoid	a	boom-bust	situation.		Banks	cannot	be	expected	to	stop	mortgage	lending	volumes	to	grow	voluntarily,	hence	a	simple	but	effective	 traffic	management	system	helps	 to	avoid	that	 the	U.S.	economy	will	not	return	to	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	situation	again.		
	
5.2	Set	up	a	home	mortgage	quality	control	system	
	Banks	and	other	 financial	 institutions	are	very	adept	 in	developing	products	 that	help	their	profits	rise	in	the	short	term.	Subprime	mortgages	and	‘teaser’	rates	are	just	a	few	of	the	examples	that	come	to	mind.	Mortgage	backed	securitization	is	another	example.	There	is	nothing	wrong	with	the	principle	of	finding	investors	other	than	banks	to	fund	mortgage	portfolios.	However	 the	practice	as	executed	 in	 the	U.S.	 from	2004-2007	 left	much	to	be	desired.																																																																																				Banks	may	prefer	their	freedom	of	the	markets,	but	market	freedoms	should	not	come	with	a	price	tag	for	society	as	a	whole,	which	is	at	odds	with	the	benefit	of	the		
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	Mortgage	lending	was	at	the	amber	level	in	2002-2003.	The	policy	measures	needed	at	that	point	would	have	been	 twofold:	 to	 introduce	a	product	 liability	 system	 for	banks	and	introduce	a	macro-economic	reserve	policy	(MERP).		Most	 companies,	when	 they	 sell	 a	 product,	 provide	 a	 guarantee	 that	 the	 product	will	operate	satisfactorily	during	the	lifetime	of	the	product.	Banks	cannot	guarantee	that	the	home	mortgage	client	will	not	default	on	home	mortgage	payments.	However	the	amber	stage	in	home	mortgage	lending	indicates	that	the	net	volume	growth	in	new	lending	is	reaching	 a	 dangerous	 pitch.	 The	 Fed	 and	 with	 it	 all	 other	 bank	 and	 financial	 sector	regulators	could	stipulate	that	any	new	home	mortgage	requires	a	financial	reserve	set	aside	 within	 the	 originating	 institution	 at	 a	 higher	 level	 than	 the	 previous	 one.	 For	instance,																																																												12	http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/203740.pdf	13	http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/search?startMonth=12&startDay=31&startYear=2007&endMonth=12&endDay=31&endYear=2015	
	 25	
																																																																																																														The	myth	of	economic	growth	in	the	United	States©Drs	Kees	De	Koning																																																																																																																									If	3%	was	the	expectation	of	the	annual	level	of	doubtful	debtors	before	the	amber	stage,	the	Fed	could	dictate	that	5%	is	added	to	the	reserves	for	any	new	home	mortgage.	The	second	stipulation	could	be	that	such	reserves	have	to	be	kept	 in	place	until	 the	home	mortgage	has	been	fully	repaid.	Selling	the	funding	side	of	the	mortgage	to	third	parties	should	not	be	a	factor	in	releasing	such	reserves.	They	should	stay	in	place	until	the	end	of	the	mortgage	period.		The	‘red’	stage	requires	a	more	drastic	approach,	as	this	stage	reflects	the	fact	that	the	macro-economic	development	of	the	relevant	country	is	at	serious	risk.	This	happened	during	 2004-2006	 in	 the	 U.S.	 	 A	 material	 macro-economic	 risk	 necessitates	 a	 quite	different	counter-measure.			Jobs	are	at	risks.	8	million	people	lost	their	jobs	as	a	consequence	of	the	financial	crisis.	Government	 funding	 is	 at	 risk	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 doubling	 of	 government	 debt	from	$9	trillion	to	nearly	$19	trillion	over	the	period	2007-2015.	The	financial	stability	of	 25	million	 households	was	 at	 risk	 as	 foreclosure	 proceedings	were	 started	 against	them.	Building	 enough	new	homes	was	put	 at	 risk.	 If	 annually	1.5	million	new	homes	were	needed,	the	cumulative	shortfall	over	the	period	2008-2015	reached	6	million.		The	macro-economic	risks	caused	by	an	excessive	speed	of	lending	put	not	only	banks	at	risk,	 but	 also	 jobs,	 incomes,	 pension	 savings,	 government	 expenditure,	 home	 building	and	of	course	companies	due	to	a	reduced	demand	for	goods	and	services.		A	well	considered	response	would	be	to	ensure	that	at	 the	red	stage	the	new	reserves	built	up	for	doubtful	debtors	on	home	mortgages	are	available	not	just	to	the	banks	and	their	shareholders,	but	to	the	population	at	large:	from	Wall	Street	to	Main	Street.	Such	a	MERP	would	consist	of	two	elements:	firstly,	it	would	increase	the	reserve	ratio	to	some	8%	 for	 all	 new	 home	mortgage	 lending	 and	 secondly,	 the	 reserves	 should	 be	 placed	away	from	the	lender	and	at	the	Fed	in	the	form	of	U.S.	government	securities.	It	could	be	decided	that	such	reserves	have	to	stay	at	the	Fed	until	the	mortgage	loans	have	been	repaid.	Furthermore	as	the	threat	is	one	to	the	macro-economy	of	the	U.S.,	such	reserves		should	be	pledged	to	the	Fed	and	the	U.S.	government	 in	case	of	bank	failure.	 In	effect	the	 transfer	 of	 reserves	 to	 the	 Fed	 would	 constitute	 a	 provisional	 penalty	 for	 the	financial	 institution	 involved	 in	 order	 to	 get	 the	micro	 and	 the	macro	 policies	 in	 line.	Rather	 than	 issuing	 penalties	 after	 the	 recession	 period	 as	 is	 being	 done	 currently,	 a	preventive	method	would	be	the	up-front	transfer	of	reserve	amounts	based	on	net	new	home	mortgage	 lending.	 	 The	 return	 of	 such	 reserve	 funds	 to	 the	 financial	 institution	involved	should	only	take	place	once	the	performance	of	the	underlying	mortgages	can	be	assessed	as	 satisfactory	with	 ‘satisfactory’	denoting	a	portfolio	performance	 in	 line	with	that	of	the	best	lending	years.		
5.4	 Introduce	 index-linked	Treasuries	especially	 for	pension	savers	and	pension	
funds	
	 The	 U.S.	 government	 will	 need	 to	 decide	 whether	 it	 is	 has	 struck	 the	 right	 balance	between	getting	its	government	debt	level	funded	at	the	lowest	possible	costs	and			
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